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Purpose: Despite decades of research, the relationship between intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) and FDI remains ambiguous. Using a recently developed patent enforcement index 
(along with a broader IPR index) and a large sectoral country-to-country FDI dataset, we revisit 
the FDI-IPR relationship by testing the impact of IPRs on UK and US outward FDI flows as 
well as earnings from outward FDI. 
Design/methodology/approach: We use disaggregated data for up to 9 distinct sectors of 
economic activity from both the US and UK for outward FDI flows and earnings from outward 
FDI, for a panel of up to 42 developed and developing countries over sample periods from 
1998 to 2015. We employ a panel fixed effects approach that allows us to exploit the 
longitudinal properties of the data using Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) nonparametric covariance 
matrix estimator. 
Findings: We do not find any consistent evidence in support of the hypothesis that countries’ 
strength of IPR protection or enforcement affects inward FDI, or that sector of investment 
matters. Our results prove robust to sensitivity checks that include an alternative broader 
measure of IPR strength, analyses across sub-samples disaggregated according to the strength 
of countries’ IPRs as well as developing vs. developed economies, and an extended 
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specification accounting for dynamic effects of the response of FDI to both previous investment 
levels and IPR (patent) protection. 
Originality: We make use of the largest most granular sectoral country-to-country FDI dataset 
employed to date in the analysis of the FDI-IPR nexus with disaggregated data for outward 
FDI and earnings from outward FDI across up to 9 distinct sectors of economic activity from 
both the US and UK. We employ a more sophisticated measure of IPR strength, the patent 
index proposed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014), which places emphasis on the effectiveness of 
enforcement practices as perceived by managers, together with the overall administrative 
effectiveness and efficiency of the national patent system. 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Multinational Corporations (MNCs) sits at the heart of 
economic globalization and is a major catalyst to economic growth. Knowledge of whether 
and how Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) affect FDI is, therefore, paramount. The 
international exploitation of Intellectual Property (IP) is central for FDI across borders, as 
MNCs strive to exploit their IP-related assets internationally. The incongruence between the 
growing need for international exploitation of IP and the territorial and often underdeveloped 
nature of IPRs, especially in developing and transition economies, has led to pressures for 
systemic change in recent years at national and supranational level. These pressures underpin 
extensive bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations on IPRs, leading to a significant 
expansion of required minimum standards, especially in developing and transition economies. 
Such expansion culminated in the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Although this movement, which is 
consistent with processes of globalization through the reduction of barriers to FDI, should 
have attenuated problems with the legal frameworks involved in the protection of IPRs, 
concerns related to the harmonization of IPR regimes across countries and continuing 
difficulties in protecting IP-related assets associated with deficiencies in the enforcement of 
IPRs remain. 
Against this backcloth, and despite several decades of research on the IPR-FDI nexus, 
the relationship between the two remains ambiguous. As pointedly noted by the recent review 
article by Noon, De Vita and Appleyard (2019), conflicting theoretical predictions on how 
the strength of a country’s IPR system can affect MNCs’ FDI location choice have been 
hypothesized over the years and, taken collectively, the empirical literature is equally 
contradictory and inconclusive.  
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Three main reasons have been attributed responsibility for the inability of previous 
applied work to reach a consensus on the relationship between IPRs and FDI. First, since the 
work of Mansfield (1994), it has been advanced that the importance of IPRs on MNCs’ FDI 
decision varies markedly across sectors of economic activity (see, e.g., Maskus, 2000).  
Nevertheless, even recent contributions on the IPR-FDI nexus still tend to focus exclusively 
on manufacturing industry FDI at aggregate level (e.g., Papageorgiadis et al., 2020). Indeed, 
only few studies have used sector-disaggregated data to test for the role of industry sector in 
the FDI-IPR relationship (see Park and Lippoldt, 2003; Javorcik, 2004; Nunnenkamp and 
Spatz, 2004; Nicholson, 2007; Ushijima, 2013; Watkins and Taylor, 2010) and their findings 
are conflicting.  
Second, scarcity of quality FDI data has led to systematic inconsistencies in 
measurement across most previous studies, often plaguing the reliability of reported results 
(Noon et al., 2019). In particular, aggregate FDI measures based on count data or the net 
accumulated stock of FDI provide insufficiently precise measures to gauge how FDI responds 
to changes in IPRs over time, especially when short sample periods - which in many papers 
are restricted to one, two or three years (see, e.g., Ferrantino, 1993; Mansfield, 1995; Braga 
and Fink, 1998; Maskus, 2000; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004; Seyoum, 2006; Nicholson, 
2007; Watkins and Taylor, 2010) - are considered. Most importantly, although firms’ FDI 
location decisions are mostly driven by the profitability of their FDIs rather than volume per 
se, it is striking that no study to date has employed a country’s firms earnings from FDI as a 
measure that would more closely reflect the extent to which a host country’s strength of IPR 
protection might affect MNCs’ profitability from FDI and, hence, their propensity to further 
invest in those countries.  
Third, the measurement of the strength of IPR protection has been a thorny issue 
(Noon et al., 2019). Rapp and Rozek’s (1990) index only accounts for one type of IP, patents. 
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The Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) indices extend the mapping of the measurement 
of patent protection to different categories but their aggregate score of IPR protection 
strength still constitutes a de jure measure solely based on how IPR laws are written ‘on the 
books’ thereby neglecting the crucial de facto enforcement of such laws. The application of 
dissuasive penalties against those firms found to be violating other firms’ IPRs, is an element 
also ignored in studies using counts of IPR reform or treaties crudely captured by dummy 
variables (see, e.g., Branstetter et al., 2007; Canals and Şener, 2014).  
We break new ground in revisiting the relationship between IPRs and FDI by 
specifically addressing the limitations of previous work. Three main innovations underlie our 
contribution. First, we make use of disaggregated outward FDI (OFDI) flows data across up 
to 9 distinct sectors of economic activity from both the US and UK (in addition to total 
manufacturing and aggregate OFDI flows), alongside analogous data for earnings from OFDI 
(EOFDI) for each of these two countries, to a panel of up to 42 developed and developing 
countries over sample periods from 1998 to 2015. This is by far the largest and most granular 
country-to-country, sectoral FDI dataset employed to date in the analysis of the FDI-IPR 
nexus. In the absence of qualitative, firm-level data on MNCs’ FDI motivations and type of 
FDI, sectoral disaggregation - as suggested by many authors (e.g., Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 
2004) - becomes paramount to distinguish between FDI arising from MNCs from industries 
with higher and those with lower technological intensity and IP-content. Indeed, although 
there is no fully developed industry-level theory of FDI defining the appropriability regime of 
industry-specific technologies, it appears reasonable to allow for the possibility that MNCs 
from high IP-content and R&D intensive industries such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
may be more concerned about IPRs than MNCs from industries such as transportation and 
storage. As such, our sectoral disaggregation offers a lens to investigate whether aggregate 
results may mask different effects across industries. Additionally, our complementary 
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adoption of data on FDI earnings by industry sectors more accurately captures how IPR 
protection affects sectoral FDI location decisions given that earnings on equity investments 
(profitability) may differ across sectors.   
Second, we employ a more sophisticated measure of IPR strength, the patent index 
(IPS) proposed by Papageorgiadis et al. (2014), which places emphasis on the effectiveness 
of enforcement practices as perceived by managers, together with the overall administrative 
effectiveness and efficiency of the national patent system. While the investment chapters of 
recent Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) include IP 
rights within their scope of application, it is the host country’s domestic enforcement of such 
internationally agreed rights that matters to foreign investing firms. This makes our domestic 
measure of patent enforcement the most informative to detect how a country’s IPR protection 
may affect FDI location (country) decisions. For robustness and comparative purposes, we 
also use a broader, aggregate index of IPR strength (IPRI) published by the Property Rights 
Alliance (PRA), which includes copyrights and trademarks (see 
https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/). 
Finally, our analysis advances on previous econometric specifications and estimation 
methods in several respects. Our models include most variables hypothesized to have 
explanatory power on FDI determination. Additionally, whilst prior analyses of IPR-FDI 
models have hardly ever been concerned with the problem of cross-sectional dependence - 
which can have non-trivial consequences for the reliability of estimation and hypothesis 
testing - we use fixed-effects (FE) regression models with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard 
errors that allow to alleviate problems of cross-sectional (spatial) and temporal dependence.  
Our main results, that prove robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses, do not show 
any consistent evidence in support of the hypothesis that the strength of IPRs or patent 
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enforcement affect UK or US FDI into developed or developing economies, irrespective of 
industry and host country characteristics. 
 
2. A synthesis of related literature  
There is no general theory of the relationship between FDI and IPRs. Nevertheless, several 
frameworks and hypotheses exist offering often contrasting views on how firms’ FDI location 
choice may be induced or deterred by strong or weak IPR protection in host countries. For 
example, Dunning’s (1977, 1979a, 1979b, 2000) Ownership (O), Location (L), and 
Internalization (I) (OLI) paradigm, an FDI framework frequently applied to the analysis of 
the IPR-FDI nexus, leads to conflicting predictions on the relationship between a country’s 
strength of IPR protection and inward FDI. On the one hand, the OLI paradigm suggests that 
strong IPR protection can be considered a country’s ‘location advantage’ in that by reducing 
the risk of local imitation thanks to greater enforcement of MNCs’ IP-related ‘ownership 
advantages’, it enhances FDI attraction. On the other hand, when examined through the lens 
of the ‘internalization’ element, strong IPR protection can be expected to affect negatively 
inward FDI by inducing MNCs to choose licensing agreements with producers in developing 
countries over FDI (Braga and Fink, 1998). Following this logic, FDI would be preferred 
only under weak IPR protection in host countries because internalized production would 
allow MNCs to maintain greater direct control over their IP-related assets (Ferrantino, 1993). 
It follows that despite its usefulness in highlighting some possible channels through which 
firms’ FDI may be induced or deterred by the strength of IPRs of host environments, the OLI 
paradigm does not lead to determinate predictions. 
Some complex, partial- or dynamic general-equilibrium models have also been 
developed to examine the effects of IPRs on FDI-driven technology transfer from Northern 
MNCs into the developing world, ‘the South’ (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Helpman, 
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1993; Lai, 1998; Markusen, 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Glass and Wu, 2007; Branstetter 
and Saggi, 2011; Yang, 2013; Mathew and Mukherjee, 2014; Tanaka and Iwaisako, 2014). 
Varying and often contrasting simplifying assumptions underlie these models, including 
whether subsidies are considered, innovation is treated as a ‘quality improvement’ or a 
‘variety expansion’, the MNC is regarded as an industry leader or a follower, a third 
developing country is included in the model, and whether imitation is treated as costless 
and/or endogenously determined. Overall, also as a result of the different assumptions, these 
economic models studying the effects of strengthened IPRs in ‘the South’ on FDI by 
Northern MNCs, are divided as to whether developing countries would attract greater FDI.  
Against this backcloth, we conclude that given the many different theoretical channels 
postulated and conflicting effects hypothesized, the aggregate net effect of the strength of IPR 
protection on FDI attraction remains theoretically ambiguous.  
Taken collectively, the empirical literature has failed to square such theoretical 
ambiguity, with many studies finding positive (Mansfield, 1994, and 1995; Lee and 
Mansfield, 1996; Maskus, 2000; Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004; Javorcik, 2004; Seyoum, 
2006; Park and Lippoldt, 2003; Branstetter et al., 2007; Adams, 2010; Hsu and Tiao, 2015) as 
well as negative or statistically insignificant effects (Ferrantino, 1993; Kondo, 1995; Seyoum, 
1996; Braga and Fink, 1998; Mayer and Pfister, 2001; Fosfuri, 2004; Watkins and Taylor, 
2010).  
The mixed findings are puzzling but as noted by Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004, p. 
395), ‘there are various reasons to suspect that the impact of IPR protection on FDI is blurred 
unless industry characteristics and host-country conditions are taken into account’.  Indeed, 
since the work of Mansfield (1994), it has been advanced that the strength of the IPR-FDI 
relationship may depend on the technological intensity characterizing the type of FDI and the 
industry of investment. Mansfield (1994 and 1995) found that the importance of IPRs on 
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MNCs’ FDI decision varies markedly across industries, with it being much greater for firms 
in the chemical, pharmaceutical, machinery, and electrical equipment industries. Braga and 
Fink (1998) too emphasized that without strong IPR protection, MNCs may be deterred from 
investing in sectors with high IP content such as R&D and technology-intensive 
manufacturing processes. Maskus (2000) observed that FDI in lower technology goods and 
services, such as textiles and apparel, electronic assembly, and distribution, depends much 
less on the strength of IPR protection than on input costs and market opportunities. FDI in 
products or technologies that entail a high cost of imitation may also reduce the importance 
of IPR regimes in FDI location decisions. On the other hand, FDI in easily imitable products 
and technologies, such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals and software, is more sensitive to the 
strength of IPRs. This proposition explains Maskus’ call (2000, p. 15) ‘the need is acute for 
sectoral breakdowns of investment’.  
Yet, partly due to data limitations, contributions based on sectoral breakdowns of FDI 
continue to be rare (see, e.g., Papageorgiadis et al., 2020, which focuses exclusively on US 
manufacturing outward FDI). Only a handful of studies have employed sectoral data to test 
the mediating role of industry characteristics in the relationship between IPRs and FDI. 
Moreover, the limited evidence based on sector-disaggregated data is not univocal. Whilst 
Park and Lippoldt (2003), Javorcik (2004), Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2004) and Ushijima 
(2013) seem to agree that IPRs have a positive and significant effect on FDI only in 
technology and R&D intensive industries that rely heavily on IPR protection, Nicholson’s 
(2007) results suggest that firms in industries with high capital costs are more likely to 
maintain control over production knowledge through FDI in countries with weak IPR regimes 
while when IPRs are strong, firms in industries with high investment in R&D are more likely 
to enter a market by alternative market entry modes. To muddy the waters further, Watkins 
and Taylor (2010), whose analysis benefits from a disaggregation of FDI data across many 
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industrial sectors, conclude that their results consistently fail to support the hypothesis that 
emerging economy IPRs strongly affect the level or distribution of advanced country FDI.  
 
3. Estimation method and model  
We test the impact of IPRs on US and UK outward FDI (OFDI) flows as well as earnings 
from OFDI (EOFDI) on a large panel of countries. The underlying logic for investigating 
whether IPRs may affect EOFDI stems from the possibility that while IPRs may not have an 
impact on the quantity or volume of FDI, they may correlate with the profitability of any 
such investment. After all, MNCs’ appropriation of returns for their FDI in areas such as 
R&D and innovation is inevitably contingent on the existence of patent-related legislation in 
the legal framework of countries as well as the ability of government agents and institutional 
actors to enforce it. Taking earnings from OFDI as an additional FDI measure could, 
therefore, unveil - particularly in our sectoral level analysis - interesting correlations 
precisely because industries which rely on distinct technologies or high IP content may, 
under different appropriability regimes, experience different profitability levels than 
industries which undertake less R&D and are less concerned with IPR protection. 
The US was an obvious choice as our headquarters country of reference, it being the 
largest source economy of outward FDI and the one most frequently used in past papers 
studying the effects of IPRs in the developing world on FDI by MNCs from the North. The 
US is also one of the few countries that makes publicly available reliable and comprehensive 
estimates of FDI financial transactions at sectoral level (which are rare to come by and very 
hard to assemble) via the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). But, of course, it seemed 
opportune to take one more source country as a consistency check in our analysis. Inspection 
of the data at the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), confirmed that we would be able 
to compile an adequately sized and sufficiently comparable dataset of reliable sectoral level 
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country-to-country OFDI flows and EOFDI for the UK. The UK too is highly representative, 
ranking fourth among all world economies in terms of FDI outflows (UNCTAD, 2018, p. 6), 
making it another suitable source country for our analysis. 
A serious issue likely to apply across the units of panel data made up of countries 
considered in IPR-FDI regressions that is largely ignored in previous studies, is cross-
sectional dependence, which can arise due to spatial or spillover effects and have serious 
consequences for the reliability of estimation and validity of hypothesis testing. 
Accordingly, at the preliminary stage of our analysis we tested for cross-sectional 
dependence (CSD) using Pesaran’s (2015) CSD test. The significant test results (not 
reported to conserve space) showed support for the alternative hypothesis of ‘strong cross-
sectional dependence’ in both data samples. This means that, in addition to removing 
entirely the time dimension information of our longitudinal data panel (paramount to capture 
the evolution of FDI as well as IPR indices over time), performing cross-sectional estimation 
as done in several previous studies on the IPR-FDI nexus would lead, by ignoring the 
dependence of regression disturbances between cross-sectional units, to biased statistical 
inference (Pesaran, 2005; Hoechle, 2007). Furthermore, as observed by Hoechle (2007, p. 
282), ‘standard error estimates of commonly applied covariance matrix estimation 
techniques […] are biased, and hence statistical inference on such standard errors is invalid.’  
It is for these reasons that we employ a fixed effects approach that allows us to exploit the 
longitudinal properties of the data, using Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) nonparametric 
covariance matrix estimator, which produces heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional and temporal dependence. The 
coefficient estimates resulting from this approach are not only consistent but also efficient 
(Hoechle, 2007). 
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Estimation is undertaken on an unbalanced panel at annual frequency, following a 
standard specification: 
 0it it it itOFDIF a X = + +   (1) 
 0it it it itOFDIE X e = + +   (2) 
where itOFDIF  is outward FDI flows per sector to the selected economies, and itOFDIE  is 
earnings from outward FDI. For the UK, our sample consists of 18 economies (Brazil; 
Canada; China; France; Germany; Hong Kong, China; India; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Malaysia; 
Netherlands; Norway; Singapore; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; USA) over the period 1998-
2015. For the USA, we benefit from a larger sample of 42 countries (Argentina; Australia; 
Austria; Belgium; Brazil; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; Czech Republic; Denmark; 
Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hong Kong, China; Hungary; India; Indonesia; Ireland; 
Israel; Italy; Japan; South Korea; Malaysia; Mexico; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; 
Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Russia; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; 
Thailand; Turkey; United Kingdom; Venezuela) over 1999-2014. 
 The recipient countries used for the empirical investigation are the most 
representative as they attract substantial FDI flows from UK and US firms. Specifically, the 
percentage of UK FDI flows to these countries and earnings from FDI as a share of UK’s 
total FDI flows and total earnings from FDI, are 66 and 68%, respectively. For the US 
dataset, these percentages are both approximately 67%. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. FDI data 
Outward foreign direct investment flows (OFDIit) relate to investments by a US/UK person 
or resident company in a non-US/UK affiliate or branch. In accordance with international 
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guidelines (e.g., OECD, 1996), foreign investment must be at least 10% of the ordinary 
shares or voting power. 
The net FDI earnings data (EOFDIit) are a measure of the returns that investors obtain 
from FDI after deduction of provisions for depreciation and taxes on profits. For the US 
dataset, they are based on the aggregation of data items reported on BEA’s direct investment 
surveys by US MNCs for US direct investment abroad. Such FDI income receipts and 
payments consist of income received by US parent companies and affiliates who own assets 
classified in the direct investment functional category. Income measures the return that 
parents and affiliates receive on their equity and debt investments and consists of the parents’ 
shares of the earnings and losses from current operations of affiliates plus interest received 
and paid on intercompany debt (BEA, 2014). Similarly, the UK EOFDI data sourced from 
ONS are based on the annual FDI surveys to businesses, in line with the Statistics of Trade 
Act 1947. FDI earnings are net values measuring the profits and interest generated by the 
direct investor (parent company) from their affiliates. Such survey data are complemented by 
and cross-checked against data from the Bank of England for all monetary financial 
institutions and other sources for property and public corporations in FDI. Survey responses 
are used to impute EOFDI values for every company in the UK’s outward FDI populations. 
Reliability of such annual survey data is further ensured by larger sample sizes than the 
quarterly surveys. Response rates are also analyzed by proportion of Net Book Value 
received and by industry sector and size band following the Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC), which allows for a precise assignment of industry sector categorization.  
Our sectoral disaggregation is based on the industry classification of the MNC rather 
than the subsidiary, inevitably so given the features of available data. Yet, this should not 
constitute an issue given that relatively few subsidiaries are creating new technologies, more 
commonly transferred by the MNC’s headquarters. We have made every effort to incorporate 
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in our analysis the contribution of the largest sectors in terms of OFDI flows and EOFDI. For 
the UK sample, due to data limitations we have resorted to selecting 9 sectors plus ‘Total 
Manufacturing’ (and an aggregate measure of total OFDI flows and EOFDI) out of the 17 
reported in the ONS’ annual bulletins. These are: food, beverages and tobacco; petroleum, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastic; textiles and wood; metal and machinery; retails 
and wholesale trade, repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles; other manufacturing; 
transportation and storage; financial services; construction; and total manufacturing. The 
selected sectors account for 84% of UK OFDI flows and 72% of UK EOFDI out of all UK 
sectors. 
For the US dataset, we selected 16 sectors out of the 71 currently reported in BEA’s 
annual industry economic accounts but to allow tractability and achieve greater consistency 
with the UK sample we aggregate them into 8 sectors plus ‘Total manufacturing’. The 
selected 16 (but aggregated into 8) sectors account for 91% of both US OFDI flows and US 
EOFDI out of all US sectors. These are: mining; food; chemicals; primary fabricated metals; 
machinery; other manufacturing; computers, electrical and transportation; other industry; and 
total manufacturing. 
It is worth noting that the intention to incorporate more sectors and more countries in 
our dataset was hampered by the many missing values in both the ONS and BEA databases 
due to data suppressed to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies, and absolute 
values not reported if less than £500,000/$500,000 in the respective UK/US databases. 
Evidently, we can do nothing about this feature of the data but as noted above our datasets 
cover approximately two thirds of the whole population of OFDI flows and EOFDI of US 
and UK MNCs. Moreover, as shown in Table 2a, for the UK aggregate sample (N=18, 
T=18), we only lose six observations due to missing values for OFDIit (318 observations 
available for estimation out of 324 of a full sample) and only two for EOFDIit (322 
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observations available). Similarly, for the aggregate US sample (N=42, T=16, see Table 2b) 
we only record 11 missing values for OFDIit and no missing values at all for EOFDIit (the 
full 672 observations are available for estimation), thus offering adequate reassurances. 
 
4.2. Measures of IPRs 
We advance on the norm of outdated IPR indices such as Park (2008), which does not 
consider the effectiveness of patent enforcement in practice in courts and other areas of 
policing the law (see, e.g., Brander et al., 2017), by employing the IPR enforcement index 
(Papageorgiadis et al., 2014, henceforth IPS) that provides estimates of the level of 
transaction costs that IP-owning firms face when engaging with a national patent system (for 
a recent application of this index on how the strength of IP institutions affects Chinese 
outward FDI, see Alexiou & Vogiazas, 2021). The data used to quantify the components of 
an IP system include items such as the effectiveness of judicial and police enforcement and 
the level of corruption in the judiciary that measure the perceptions of IP asset owners of how 
enforcement agents behave in IPR regimes. As recently noted by Papageorgiadis et al. 
(2020), ‘These perceptions capture the unwritten rules that influence how enforcement agents 
operate in legal arenas.’ 
For comparative purposes, we also use the International Property Rights index 
(henceforth IPRI) that is published annually (since 2007) by the Property Rights Alliance (an 
index also recently used by Malen and Vaaler, 2017). The IPRI index has three core 
components: a) legal and political environment; b) physical property rights; c) intellectual 
property rights (protection of IPRs, patent protection, copyright piracy). IPRI scores and 
rankings are based on data obtained from official sources made publicly available by 
established international organizations. It should be noted that all these IPR country indices 
are based on annual data, thus they already account for country level shifts in IPR regulation 
(e.g., IPR reforms) and the effects of global influences on national IPR legislation such as 
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multilateral treaties and international or regional agreements (e.g., accession to WTO, 
ASEAN, NAFTA) covering the application of IP rights to FDI promotion and protection. 
 
4.3. Other FDI determinants 
Equations (1) and (2) also include itX , a vector of variables accounting for other FDI 
determinants (see Table 1) amply used in FDI literature (see, e.g., Cushman and De Vita, 
2017), namely, population as a proxy for market size ( itPOP ), GDP growth to capture the 
rate of economic development ( itGDP ), openness proxied by trade-to-GDP ratio ( itTRADE ), 
inflation as measure of macroeconomic stability ( itINF ), the KPMG corporate tax rate (
it
CORTAX ), industry as a measure of industrial development of a country ( itINDU ), the 
‘rate of change’ (log form) of  the annual period average exchange rate (defined as annual 
average spot exchange rate of the national currency into pound sterling/USD) from one year 
to the next, an exchange rate measure which solves the scaling problem of cross-sectional 
heterogeneity ( itEXRC ), fixed telephone subscriptions to capture the level of information 
infrastructure ( itINFRA ), exports of goods from the UK/US to partner countries ( itEXP ), 
educational attainment as a proxy for human capital ( itEDUC ), and political stability as a 
measure of the perception of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated 
violence, including terrorism ( itPSAVT ). Additional controls and dynamic effects as they 
pertain to how OFDI and EOFDI may respond to previous levels of investment and IPR 
protection are accounted for in our robustness regressions.  
Table 1 provides a description of all variables and sources. Tables 2a and 2b present 
descriptive statistics for the UK and US samples, respectively, and Table 3 describes the 
sectors considered. 
[Tables 1, 2a, 2b, 3 about here] 
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5. Results  
We begin by considering regressions on OFDI flows for both the UK and US, presented in 
Table 4a and 4b, respectively. For the UK sample, the property rights coefficients (IPS) are 
statistically insignificant on aggregate (column 1) and across all sectors (columns 2 to 11) 
with the sole exceptions of ‘Transportation and storage’ (‘TS’ in column 8) with an estimated 
coefficient of -3.846 statistically significant at the 1% level, and ‘Metal and machinery 
products’ (‘MM’ in column 5) with an estimate of 1.749 significant at 10%. A similar result 
is obtained from the US data sample (Table 4b), where the IPS coefficient is only significant 
at 10% on ‘Aggregate’ (-0.499, in column 1), and at 1% for the ‘Food’ sector (‘F’, in column 
4) with an estimated coefficient of -0.865. 
[Tables 4a and 4b about here] 
 A similar pattern of no relationship between IPRs (IPS) and FDI emerges from our 
regressions on UK (Table 5a) and US (Table 5b) earnings from outward FDI (EOFDI). As 
shown in Table 5a, the only significant IPS coefficient at any credible statistical level (5% or 
less) pertains to ‘Textiles and Wood activities’ (‘TW’, in column 3) with an estimated 
coefficient of -1.096, and ‘Construction’ (‘C’, in column 10) with an estimated coefficient of 
-1.157. These results are consistent with those of Table 5b for the US sample, where none of 
the IPS coefficients are significant. 
[Tables 5a and 5b about here] 
To interrogate the data further, we regress OFDI flows for both the UK (Table 6a) and 
US (Table 6b) on samples disaggregated according to high (Panel A) and low (Panel B) IPS 
regimes (based on the median IPS sample value), respectively. Given that our central interest 
here lies in detecting the correlation between IPR protection and FDI, to conserve space, from 
now on our tables of results do not report the estimated coefficients of all other control 
variables albeit included in the regressions. Panel A of Table 6a displays some negative 
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estimated coefficients at reasonable significance levels (5% or less), namely, ‘Aggregate’ 
OFDI flows in column 1 (-4.225**), ‘Textiles and wood activities’ (‘TW’) in column 3 (-
6.174***), and ‘Transportation and storage’ (‘TS’) in column 8 (-7.206**). These results are 
somewhat puzzling since host country conditions characterized by strong IPR protection 
(high IPS regime) should not, theoretically, discourage UK OFDI flows, especially in sectors 
that do not entail high IP content or R&D such as ‘TW’ and ‘TS’.  The potentially spurious 
nature of the significant coefficients reported in Panel A of Table 6a is corroborated by the 
results of Panel B, for a low IPS regime, where none of the IPS coefficients (with the sole 
exception of ‘TW’ in column 3) is found to be statistically significant. Turning our attention 
to the US sample (Table 6b), under a high IPS regime (Panel A), no significant relationship is 
detected between IPS and OFDI flows across the ten regressions, and only ‘Primary 
fabricated metals’ (‘PFM’, in column 6) with an estimated coefficient of -0.729 is significant 
(at 5%) in the ten regressions under a low IPS regime (Panel B).  
[Tables 6a and 6b about here] 
 We repeat these latest estimations using EOFDI as the dependent variable for both the 
UK and US, with the results presented in Table 7a and 7b, respectively. For the UK, under a 
high IPS regime (Panel A), no estimated coefficient is statistically significant, while for a low 
IPS regime (Panel B) the only statistically significant coefficients out of the eleven 
regressions are for ‘TW’ in column 3 with a value of -1.248 (significant at 1%) and 
‘Construction’ (‘C’ in column 10) with a value of -2.023 (significant at 5%). For the US 
sample (Table 7b), under a high IPS regimes (Panel A), only three out of the ten regressions 
record statistically significant values (all at 5%). These pertain to ‘Mining’ in column 2 
(1.483), ‘Total manufacturing’ in column 3 (0.646) and ‘Computers, electrical and 
transportation’ in column 9 (1.127). However, none of the IPR (IPS) coefficients in Panel B, 
under a low IPS regime, are significant at any reasonable level (1 or 5%). 
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[Tables 7a and 7b about here] 
Overall, therefore, our results do not show any consistent evidence in support of the 
hypothesis that the strength of IPRs affects UK or US OFDI flows or EOFDI, at both 
aggregate and sectoral level. Indeed, aside from few sporadic exceptions - and mostly under a 
high IPS regime where we would least expect IPR protection to discourage FDI – sectoral 
estimates are statistically insignificant with no clear or robust pattern emerging in support of 
the proposition that without strong IPR protection MNCs may be deterred from investing in 
sectors with high IP content such as R&D and technology-intensive manufacturing processes.  
As for comparison with previous empirical studies claiming a significant IPR-FDI 
relationship, as noted in our review of past applied work, we rationalize the discrepancy in 
terms of unreliable past inferences based predominantly on cross-sectional estimations that 
are invalid in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, often rudimentary measures 
employed to capture IPR protection, and the use of aggregate FDI data that do not allow for a 
sectoral, country-to-country FDI-IPR panel econometric set up in estimation. That said, 
among the mixed results reported in previous literature, our findings align to those by 
Watkins and Taylor (2010) who tested the effect of IPRs on US FDI in 22 emerging 
economies from 2006 to 2008. They used the Ginarte and Park (1997) index and the survey 
based IPR index of the World Economic Forum (WEF). Their various multivariate models, 
based on FDI data disaggregated across nine industries and eight sectors within the 
manufacturing industry, also provided no support to the hypothesis that emerging economies’ 
IPRs affect the level or distribution of advanced country FDI. Like Watkins and Taylor 
(2010), we conclude that this result may be due to the fact that IPRs may simply be 
insufficiently significant for a large majority of the industries involved in FDI or that the 
influence of IPRs may be heavily outweighed by the broader set of determinants that 
influence MNCs’ FDI location decisions. 
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6. Further analysis and robustness 
By way of robustness we extend the analysis in three ways. First, we check the sensitivity of 
our results to an alternative IPR measure, the International Property Rights index (IPRI) 
published annually (since 2007) by the Property Rights Alliance. Second, although we have 
already conducted regressions on disaggregated datasets for our UK and US samples 
according to high and low IPS regimes, we now test the OFDI and EOFDI response to the 
strength of IPR (IPS) protection with respect to developed versus developing countries, an 
analysis which due to data limitations will be restricted to the US dataset. 
Finally, we check the sensitivity of our results (based on a parsimonious model aimed 
at avoiding over-parameterization) to potentially omitted variables and introduce dynamic 
effects in a new robustness model specification. Specifically, to account for OFDI or EOFDI 
potentially responding to previous levels of investment, we include a lagged term of FDI 
stock, the total accumulated value of foreign-owned assets at period t-1. Another permutation 
pertains to the possibility of a dynamic response of FDI to IPR protection. Theoretically, how 
IPR protection affects particularly profit from FDI is not unambiguous. Our previous analysis 
assumed a contemporaneous correlation. Yet, as it is the case for FDI possibly responding to 
previous investment levels, it appears opportune to investigate also the possibility that OFDI 
and especially EOFDI may respond to IPR protection with a lag. Accordingly, in these 
robustness regressions we also include, in addition to patent enforcement in the current 
period, the lagged IPS index. The last model extension entails accounting explicitly for the 
knowledge production in various host countries as an opportunity for knowledge sourcing by 
US MNCs by including as an additional control the level of R&D (R&D) and, to gauge the 
level of innovation intensity, the host country’s total patent applications (PATENT). 
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Starting with the estimations based on the broader IPR index (IPRI), Tables 8a and 8b 
report the regression results for the UK and US OFDI samples, respectively.  For UK OFDI, 
only three columns out of eleven display statistically significant IPRI coefficients (‘TW’ in 
column 3, ‘PCPRP’ in column 4, and ‘TRM’ in column 7) but with the exception of PCPRP 
(‘Petroleum, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastic products’) which is negatively 
signed at only significant at 10% (-2.285), the other estimated coefficients are positive, a 
result at odds with a priori theory. For US OFDI (Table 8b), the only statistically significant 
IPRI coefficient (only at the 10% level) is ‘TM’ in column 3 (-1.621). Re-estimations based 
on UK and US EOFDI are reported in Tables 9a and 9b. For UK EOFDI, once again, most of 
the IPRI coefficients are insignificant at any credible statistical level, with the sole exception 
of the ‘FBT’ sector in column 2, which is negatively signed and significant at 5% (-5.213), 
‘TW’ in column 3, and ‘C’ in column 10. A similar pattern is found for US EOFDI (Table 
9b), where out of ten regressions none displays a significant IPRI coefficient at 1 or 5%. 
[Tables 8a, 8b, 9a and 9b about here] 
 Next, we disaggregate the US sample into developed vs. developing countries.1 
According to previous literature (e.g., Ginarte and Park, 1997) weak IPR protection in 
developing countries may discourage inward FDI, particularly in technology and R&D 
intensive industries. Yet, the results presented in Table 10 show that US OFDI flows are 
unaffected by the strength of IPR protection (patent enforcement) in either developed (Panel 
A) or developing countries (Panel B). Table 11 repeats the estimations with US EOFDI as the 
dependent variable. Looking at the developed countries, in Panel A, the four significant IPS 
coefficients (‘Aggregate’, ‘Total manufacturing’, ‘Food’, and ‘Computers, electrical and 
transportation’) are all positively signed. Nevertheless, for developing countries (Panel B), 
 
1 Our categorisation of developed vs. developing countries is based on the IMF classification 
(https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/weoselgr.aspx). 
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the only regression displaying a significant coefficient (negatively signed), and at only 10%, 
is ‘Mining’ (-0.630), a sector where imitative ability and hence IPR protection would not be 
expected to play a significant role on MNCs’ earnings from FDI. 
[Tables 10 and 11 about here] 
Finally, we extend the model with other controls and by including dynamic effects. 
As can be seen from Table 12a (on US OFDI) and 12b (on US EOFDI), going by the adjusted 
‘R-squared within’ values, the respective regressions of this extended specification do not 
appear to better explain the variance within the panel units each regression accounts for, and 
do not display results significantly different from those obtained thus far. For OFDI flows, 
each of the newly added variables, lagged FDISTOCK, R&D and PATENT, is only 
statistically significant at reasonable levels in, at most, three out of the ten regressions. Most 
importantly, none of the estimated IPS coefficients is significant at 5% or less, and only for 
‘TM’ (column 3) a significant coefficient is recorded for IPSt-1. 
[Tables 12a and 12b about here] 
A broadly similar picture emerges from Table 12b on EOFDI where none of the IPS 
and IPSt-1 are significant at reasonable statistical levels in ‘Aggregate’ (column 1), for total 
‘Total Manufacturing’ (column 3) and for the majority of the remaining sectors.  Interestingly 
though, the newly added independent variables, expenditure on R&D and total patent 
applications, both display a significant coefficient for the ‘Aggregate’ impact (column 1) on 
profitability from FDI, positively and negatively signed, respectively (0.580**; -0.435**), 
suggesting that the higher the level of host country R&D, the higher foreign investors’ 
profitability from FDI, while greater market competition in patented innovations reduces 
MNCs’ returns from FDI. 
 
7. Concluding discussion 
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We revisited the still unsettled question of the impact of IPRs on FDI using a recently 
developed patent enforcement index, and a comprehensive UK and US dataset on outward 
FDI (OFDI) flows as well as earnings from OFDI (EOFDI) to a large panel of countries over 
1998-2015, the most granular sectoral country-to-country sectoral FDI dataset employed to 
date in the analysis of the FDI-IPR nexus.  
We find no consistent evidence in support of the hypothesis that host country IPRs 
affect FDI, or that sector of investment matters. Our results prove robust to many sensitivity 
checks that include an alternative, broader measure of IPR strength, analyses across sub-
samples disaggregated according to the strength of countries’ IPRs as well as developing vs. 
developed economies, and an extended specification accounting for dynamic effects of the 
response of FDI to both previous investment levels and IPR (patent) protection. These 
findings suggest that the strength of IPR protection - even accounting for the all-important 
aspect of enforcement - may be, after all, less important than is generally considered for most 
industries involved in FDI.  
In rationalizing our evidence we concur with Maskus’ (1998) original insight that 
IPRs alone may generate insufficiently strong incentives for MNCs to invest (or not to invest) 
in a country due to more important country factors influencing MNCs’ FDI location 
decisions. Of course, there may be other explanations for the lack of correlation unveiled by 
our data. For example, IPRs may be irrelevant to FDI because they exert contemporaneous 
offsetting effects on firms’ FDI decisions. But it is somewhat unlikely that such offsetting 
effects would produce consistently inconsequential net impacts on alternative measures of 
FDI (flows as well as earnings from FDI), across most industries and for investments by both 
US and UK MNCs. We, therefore, lend more credence to our first interpretation of the 
evidence. Either way, the key implication for public and business policies, is that IPRs do not 
matter much, both in the wider host country’s regulatory framework to enable inward FDI or 
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for MNCs’ FDI location choice and profitability of such investment, irrespective of industry 
sector. 
Although our finding questions many of the orthodoxies suggesting that IPR 
protection may significantly deter FDI, it helps square the puzzling paradox of why, despite a 
persistent perception of weak IPR protection, countries like China are receiving large 
amounts of global FDI flows, also from countries like the US and UK, and even in sensitive 
areas such as R&D. Indeed, in spite of China’s highly publicized poor reputation for IPR 
protection and enforcement, China has been consistently ranked as one of the world’s top two 
recipient economies of FDI inflows over the past two decades, suggesting that IPR protection 
(or enforcement) is not, by itself, a significant determinant of FDI. 
Evidently, in line with our interpretation, despite the complexity and difficulties of 
operating in China, including concerns about IPRs, factors such as the size of the market 
override such concerns, which is why China remains an important market for US and UK 
MNCs’ FDI. Moreover, as observed by Zhao (2006), technologies developed by US MNCs 
with R&D investing in China (or in other weak IPR countries we would expect), mostly 
developed at MNC headquarters rather than at subsidiary level, tend to be part of a ‘closely 
knit internal innovation structure’ (Zhao, 2006, p. 1185) of the MNC, which serves as a sort 
of ‘immune system’ (ibid, p. 1185) against the inadequate protection of external institutions 
and regulations of host countries with weak IPRs; an insight consistent with our evidence and 
which offers another explanation for the finding of IPRs being statistically unrelated to FDI. 
In conclusion, IPR reform dictated by a global push for uniformity notwithstanding, 
countries keen to increase FDI attraction would be better off concentrating on policies aimed 
at enhancing their FDI-related regulatory frameworks, their investment promotion strategy, 
the quality of infrastructure and the availability of skilled labor. Mindful of the importance of 
the kind or ‘quality’ of FDI to attract, and benefits to be accrued via spillover effects, host 
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countries governments’ efforts should also focus on improving absorptive capacity and on 
creating a favorable ecosystem for science, technology and innovation. 
Despite the reliability of our results, few caveats need to be borne in mind when 
interpreting our findings. First, our data and country-to-country econometric set up prevented 
us from explicitly controlling for firm motive, the structure of MNCs and their boundaries. 
Controlling for such factors would require qualitative survey data at firm level, which are not 
readily available. Nevertheless, our sectoral disaggregation goes some way to capturing how 
differences between firms in high-tech sectors (that may be less inclined to transfer frontier 
technology and hence more concerned about IPRs) and firms in low-tech sectors (that may be 
simply looking for a low-cost base), may affect the sensitivity of FDI to IPR protection. 
Second, our choice of two source countries constrained by data availability, prevented us 
from explicitly controlling for whether it is ‘IPR protection’ itself or ‘IPR distance’ that 
matters in FDI location decisions. Yet, since one would expect IPR regimes to matter more 
for US and UK investing firms than to investing firms from countries with weaker IPRs and 
lower technological innovations, we can safely infer that ‘South-South’ FDI - being 
susceptible to even lower ‘IPR distance’ between source and host country - would be unlikely 
to yield different results. Finally, our analysis was constrained by a feature of the data that 
assigns industry measurement based on the industry of the MNC rather than the subsidiary, 
meaning that the sector is pre-determined. Yet, for horizontal integration and with the 
increasing advancement of global value chains, the importance of IPRs may also differ 
depending on whether technology is being transferred across sectors in host economies. Data 
availability permitting, including sectorally disaggregated IPR indices, these caveats provide 
a stimulating agenda for future research. 
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Table 1 Description of variables. 
Variable Description Source 
OFDI Total net foreign direct investment flows abroad 
analyzed by area and main country 
UK Office for National Statistics (1998-
2015) and US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(1999-2014) 
EOFDI Total earnings from foreign direct investment 
abroad analyzed by area and main country 
UK Office for National Statistics (1998-
2015) and US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(1999-2014) 
IPS Papageorgiadis et al. (2014) index of patent 
systems strength 




IPRI International property rights index Property Rights Alliance (2007-2015),  
https://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex
.org/  
CORTAX KPMG corporate tax rate KPMG's Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate 





INDU Industry, value added (annual percentage growth) World Development Indicators, World Bank 
(1998-2015) 
EXRC The rate of change of the annual average spot 
exchange rate national currency into pound 
sterling/dollar 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (1998-2015) 
INFRA Fixed telephone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Development Indicators (1998-2015) 
INF Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Development Indicators (1998-2015) 
GDP GDP growth to capture the level of development  World Development Indicators (1998-2015) 
POP The natural logarithm of total population World Development Indicators (1998-2015) 
TRADE Openness proxied by trade-to-GDP ratio World Development Indicators (1998-2015) 
EXP The natural logarithm of exports of goods from the 
UK/US to partners (trade value in US dollars) 
United Nations Comtrade (1998-2015) 
EDUC Educational attainment as a proxy of level of 
human resource from Barro and Lee version 2016 
educational attainment tertiary (% total population, 
age 15+). The raw observations are at five-year 
intervals through 2010. We use interpolation (and 
extrapolation for 2011–2015) to fill in the gaps. 
Barro-Lee website (1998-2014), 
http://www.barrolee.com/  
PSAVT Political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism, measuring perceptions of the 
likelihood of political instability and/or politically 
motivated violence, including terrorism (-2.5 weak 
to +2.5 strong). 




The natural logarithm of stock of FDI inflow  United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (1998-2015) 
R&D Gross domestic expenditures on research and 
development (R&D), expressed as a percent of 
GDP 
World Development Indicators (1998-2015) 
PATENT The natural logarithm of total patent applications 
(direct and PCT national phase entries) 
WIPO IP Statistics Data Centre 
https://www3.wipo.int/ipstats/keyindex.htm 
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Table 2a Summary statistics for UK sample.  
Obs
. 
Mean SD Min Max 
 
Panel A: Variables 
OFDI 318 3.51 5.25 -9.06 11.01 
EOFDI 322 5.49 3.08 -7.17 9.44 
IPS 306 7.40 1.66 4.10 9.40 
IPRI 161 7.14 1.13 4.40 8.50 
EXRC 324 -0.001 0.091 -0.674 0.423 
EDUC 306 20.83 11.52 3.29 53.94 
GDP 324 3.10 3.66 -7.36 26.28 
INF 324 2.20 2.39 -4.48 14.72 
TRADE 324 108.74 104.89 16.44 455.42 
CORTAX 324 29.90 8.26 12.50 56.66 
INDU 311 2.60 7.18 -15.37 90.43 
PSAVT 288 0.60 0.69 -1.52 1.66 
INFRA 324 43.45 18.18 1.99 74.76 
EXP 324 22.98 1.05 20.83 24.99 
POP 324 17.52 1.75 15.12 21.03 
 
Panel B: Sectors – OFDI 
Food products, beverages and tobacco products 214 1.93 4.46 -8.86 8.95 
Textiles and wood activities 237 1.02 2.98 -7.65 7.44 
Petroleum, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastic products 252 1.87 4.29 -8.62 9.44 
Metal and machinery products 298 1.48 3.21 -7.43 8.02 
Other manufacturing 304 1.30 3.67 -8.70 8.26 
Retails and wholesale trade, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
294 1.63 3.96 -7.77 9.18 
Transportation and storage 271 1.33 4.02 -8.91 10.80 
Financial services 291 2.35 5.05 -8.94 9.97 
Construction 280 1.68 3.63 -7.48 8.49 
Total manufacturing 317 2.50 4.85 -8.79 9.86 
 
Panel C: Sectors – EOFDI 
Food products, beverages and tobacco products 186 3.35 3.52 -7.38 8.60 
Textiles and wood activities 232 1.93 2.33 -5.80 8.42 
Petroleum, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastic products 241 3.83 2.51 -5.63 8.44 
Metal and machinery products 297 2.81 1.83 -4.14 7.20 
Other manufacturing 287 2.75 2.05 -4.42 7.22 
Retails and wholesale trade, repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles 
275 2.98 2.63 -7.10 7.97 
Transportation and storage 267 1.86 3.18 -6.41 8.72 
Financial services 295 4.10 3.47 -8.29 8.55 
Construction 299 2.84 2.47 -4.72 7.87 
Total manufacturing 322 4.68 2.82 -7.29 9.12 





Table 2b Summary statistics for US sample.  
Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
 
Panel A: Variables 
OFDI 661 5.27 5.27 -9.95 11.60 
EOFDI 672 7.32 2.20 -6.90 11.27 
IPS 672 6.39 2.11 2.24 9.90 
IPRI 333 6.51 1.46 2.86 8.65 
EXRC 656 0.01 0.12 -0.33 1.14 
EDUC 672 19.39 10.56 2.06 59.22 
GDP 671 3.05 3.45 -10.89 18.28 
INF 671 4.31 7.18 -4.48 85.74 
TRADE 672 89.73 73.08 18.34 442.62 
CORTAX 670 28.78 6.86 12.50 52.30 
INDU 661 2.45 5.20 -18.12 25.25 
PSAVT 672 0.30 0.94 -2.37 1.76 
INFRA 672 36.20 18.28 2.13 74.76 
EXP 672 9.10 1.33 6.22 12.65 
POP 672 17.19 1.41 15.14 21.04 
FDISTOCK 664 47.98 65.30 1.01 542.49 
R&D 590 1.52 1.02 0.05 4.43 
PATENT 669 8.72 1.62 4.77 13.74 
 
Panel B: Sectors – OFDI 
Mining 479 1.69 4.27 -7.98 9.35 
Food 508 1.91 3.39 -6.45 8.96 
Chemicals 643 2.81 3.97 -8.25 8.75 
Primary fabricated metals 499 1.47 3.07 -7.27 7.52 
Machinery 557 2.04 3.43 -6.80 8.15 
Computers, electrical and transportation 672 2.05 4.50 -8.76 8.63 
Other manufacturing 280 3.23 4.38 -8.75 9.40 
Other industry 672 4.02 5.28 -9.97 11.39 
Total manufacturing 661 4.43 4.36 -8.57 9.69 
 
Panel C: Sectors – EOFDI 
Mining 540 2.73 3.31 -6.35 8.56 
Food 608 2.84 2.40 -4.99 7.02 
Chemicals 642 4.37 2.23 -5.48 8.25 
Primary fabricated metals 600 2.02 2.27 -5.65 6.24 
Machinery 615 2.92 2.31 -4.34 6.84 
Computers, electrical and transportation 672 3.30 3.64 -8.63 8.48 
Other manufacturing 409 4.52 2.28 -4.38 8.59 
Other industry 672 6.05 3.01 -7.17 11.21 
Total manufacturing 668 5.86 2.41 -7.39 9.37 




Table 3 UK and US sectors and abbreviations. 
 
UK sectors Abbreviations 
Food products, beverages and tobacco products FBT 
Textiles and wood activities TW 
Petroleum, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastic products PCPRP 
Metal and machinery products MM 
Other manufacturing OM 
Retails and wholesale trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles TRM 
Transportation and storage TS 
Financial services FS 
Construction C 
Total manufacturing TM 
  




Primary fabricated metals PFM 
Machinery MA 
Computers, electrical and transportation CET 
Other manufacturing OM 
Other industry OI 











Table 4a Dependent variable OFDI flows – UK sample. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  
Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPS -0.821 -1.497 -0.493 0.156 1.749** -0.759 1.021 -3.846*** -0.995 1.349 -0.449 
  (0.767) (1.272) (0.668) (0.948) (0.805) (0.943) (0.586) (1.009) (1.254) (1.155) (1.184) 
INF 0.078 0.537*** -0.037 0.021 0.092 -0.063 -0.076 0.403* -0.046 0.133 0.114 
  (0.219) (0.130) (0.096) (0.136) (0.121) (0.122) (0.122) (0.206) (0.169) (0.101) (0.155) 
GDP 0.180 0.612** 0.164* -0.046 0.022 0.302* 0.061 0.053 0.254 0.048 0.244 
  (0.198) (0.264) (0.080) (0.178) (0.133) (0.163) (0.118) (0.121) (0.223) (0.192) (0.236) 
TRADE -0.042** 0.015 0.017 0.006 -0.001 0.014 0.022 -0.013 -0.031** -0.017** 0.015 
  (0.014) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) 
CORTAX 0.057 0.036 0.137 -0.047 0.017 -0.162** -0.021 0.119* 0.016 -0.146 -0.063 
  (0.080) (0.095) (0.094) (0.083) (0.104) (0.068) (0.078) (0.066) (0.111) (0.085) (0.086) 
INDU 0.055 -0.239 -0.141 0.036 -0.016 -0.105 0.058 -0.000 -0.087 -0.130 -0.140 
  (0.132) (0.152) (0.110) (0.109) (0.052) (0.103) (0.061) (0.104) (0.087) (0.083) (0.123) 
EXRC 3.369 1.135 -1.757 -15.506*** 0.529 5.328 5.881* -2.936 1.906 -4.957** -2.018 
  (4.291) (3.894) (1.989) (2.342) (3.577) (3.220) (3.136) (5.101) (3.536) (2.180) (2.705) 
EDUC -0.115 -0.162 0.092 0.263 0.009 -0.175** -0.022 0.239** -0.256 0.012 -0.128 
  (0.118) (0.102) (0.078) (0.160) (0.055) (0.072) (0.084) (0.106) (0.155) (0.082) (0.100) 
PSAVT -1.027 -1.488 -0.781 -0.628 -0.556 0.539 -2.308 -2.216 -0.678 2.634 1.609 
  (1.578) (1.960) (1.738) (1.263) (1.300) (2.263) (1.443) (2.058) (2.284) (1.962) (2.599) 
INFRA -0.052 0.000 -0.001 -0.030 -0.035 0.051 0.081* -0.028 0.005 -0.058 0.036 
  (0.085) (0.086) (0.062) (0.047) (0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.053) (0.047) (0.061) (0.054) 
EXP 2.662*** 0.106 -0.217 2.712*** 1.348** -1.454** 0.119 0.410 3.962*** -1.590*** 0.532 
  (0.603) (0.928) (0.650) (0.785) (0.589) (0.588) (0.550) (0.845) (0.926) (0.312) (0.712) 
POP -4.568 -7.529 -15.384** 10.223 4.287 7.040 22.625** -13.699 3.570 11.613* -1.901 
  (12.558) (13.033) (6.327) (8.652) (9.421) (7.934) (8.622) (8.824) (14.295) (6.487) (11.043) 
Constant 37.036 143.617 275.640** -240.977 -114.496 -78.410 -408.932** 255.261 -137.379 -166.544 28.282 
  (216.279) (223.612) (109.637) (155.969) (159.035) (136.361) (151.032) (158.491) (229.987) (110.440) (190.661) 
Observations 255 171 186 199 238 243 234 213 233 223 254 
R-squared within 0.228 0.185 0.158 0.178 0.189 0.221 0.256 0.166 0.238 0.203 0.132 







Table 4b Dependent variable OFDI flows – US sample. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.424 -0.136 -0.059 -0.865*** 0.216 -0.158 -0.044 -0.511 -0.065 -0.219 
 (0.285) (0.419) (0.428) (0.285) (0.463) (0.332) (0.352) (0.766) (0.475) (0.500) 
INF -0.069 0.023 -0.037 0.049 -0.047 0.053 0.004 -0.090 -0.021 -0.019 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.052) (0.031) (0.042) (0.033) (0.057) (0.079) (0.025) (0.074) 
GDP 0.006 -0.020 0.140 0.013 0.100 0.038 0.010 0.143 0.111 0.175 
 (0.109) (0.193) (0.084) (0.064) (0.109) (0.108) (0.074) (0.340) (0.098) (0.140) 
TRADE -0.020 0.001 0.013 -0.015** 0.013 -0.010 -0.016* -0.027 0.023 -0.026 
 (0.024) (0.012) (0.014) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) (0.018) (0.027) 
CORTAX 0.200** 0.005 0.093* 0.086 -0.024 -0.081 -0.007 -0.086 0.092* 0.148* 
 (0.076) (0.073) (0.048) (0.062) (0.049) (0.053) (0.046) (0.111) (0.049) (0.078) 
INDU -0.058 0.055 -0.031 -0.037 -0.157** -0.014 -0.007 -0.082 -0.037 -0.064 
 (0.056) (0.087) (0.053) (0.048) (0.061) (0.038) (0.061) (0.211) (0.071) (0.087) 
EXRCHAN -2.863 -4.954** -1.015 -0.496 -1.884 -1.858* -0.172 7.241* -0.181 -0.363 
 (2.334) (1.829) (2.037) (1.833) (1.514) (0.970) (1.468) (3.445) (2.317) (2.121) 
EDUC 0.028 0.045 0.101 0.094 -0.024 -0.036 0.003 0.051 0.091** 0.114*** 
 (0.072) (0.070) (0.062) (0.057) (0.043) (0.030) (0.029) (0.135) (0.041) (0.031) 
PSAVT 2.351*** 0.828 -0.527 0.420 -0.902 -0.762* 0.623 -0.868 0.229 1.487** 
 (0.581) (0.756) (0.626) (0.337) (0.544) (0.419) (0.532) (1.124) (0.532) (0.521) 
INFRA 0.036 0.014 0.033 0.036 0.095*** 0.027 -0.013 0.097 -0.029 0.046 
 (0.037) (0.020) (0.024) (0.044) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.059) (0.018) (0.046) 
EXP 1.904** -0.949 1.736*** 1.280* 1.670** 0.873 0.736 0.457 0.674 2.212** 
 (0.685) (1.067) (0.504) (0.610) (0.581) (0.633) (0.712) (1.393) (0.672) (1.008) 
POP 9.121 11.461* 8.148 -3.093 2.307 0.933 -5.884 -12.079 9.385 7.892 
 (7.989) (5.611) (4.655) (4.084) (3.119) (1.968) (3.708) (9.434) (7.924) (6.249) 
Constant -171.435 -189.115* -156.481* 43.231 -54.383 -17.023 98.891 0.000 -169.153 -155.487 
 (136.391) (93.768) (78.481) (67.160) (54.489) (32.997) (65.171) (.) (136.982) (104.960) 
Observations 630 459 630 483 612 471 528 269 641 641 
R-squared within 0.107 0.093 0.090 0.112 0.095 0.088 0.084 0.076 0.060 0.103 




Table 5a Dependent variable EOFDI – UK sample. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  
Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPS -0.050 -1.402* -1.096** -0.274 0.010 0.008 0.660 -0.687 -0.189 -1.157** 0.099 
  (0.979) (0.761) (0.460) (0.624) (0.385) (0.425) (0.979) (0.855) (1.034) (0.456) (0.551) 
INF 0.276** 0.373* -0.035 0.120 0.145** -0.027 0.272*** -0.260** 0.472*** -0.095** 0.258*** 
  (0.095) (0.182) (0.088) (0.070) (0.051) (0.056) (0.062) (0.102) (0.058) (0.043) (0.061) 
GDP -0.052 -0.145 -0.029 0.116** 0.004 0.069 -0.046 -0.134 0.001 0.243* -0.058 
  (0.172) (0.107) (0.081) (0.052) (0.069) (0.078) (0.091) (0.112) (0.164) (0.131) (0.076) 
TRADE -0.014 -0.002 -0.015** 0.012 -0.010* 0.015 0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.011 -0.008 
  (0.012) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007) (0.006) 
CORTAX -0.093 -0.168** -0.006 -0.008 0.130*** 0.005 -0.015 -0.224** -0.137* -0.007 -0.021 
  (0.076) (0.066) (0.090) (0.054) (0.040) (0.032) (0.020) (0.092) (0.070) (0.018) (0.042) 
INDU 0.111 0.067 0.016 -0.058 0.038 0.051 0.087** 0.074 0.126* -0.074 0.108** 
  (0.075) (0.043) (0.080) (0.042) (0.049) (0.038) (0.034) (0.044) (0.063) (0.050) (0.045) 
EXRC -6.629** -6.839 0.101 -2.132 -2.625 -1.752 1.962 -4.642 -3.688 5.759 -7.719** 
  (2.625) (4.690) (2.275) (3.012) (2.861) (2.106) (2.743) (2.995) (2.726) (3.344) (2.949) 
EDUC -0.149* -0.285** 0.090 0.037 0.003 -0.060 -0.036* 0.012 -0.145 -0.042 -0.078 
  (0.084) (0.118) (0.081) (0.045) (0.022) (0.042) (0.020) (0.061) (0.092) (0.038) (0.049) 
PSAVT 2.247 1.941 2.769** -0.168 -0.275 -0.852** -1.942* 1.092 1.484 -0.356 0.303 
  (2.142) (1.259) (1.026) (0.814) (0.384) (0.294) (1.006) (1.066) (2.321) (0.676) (0.710) 
INFRA -0.076 -0.070 0.020 0.091* 0.003 0.008 0.041 -0.007 -0.184*** 0.013 0.036 
  (0.054) (0.066) (0.036) (0.048) (0.019) (0.012) (0.035) (0.031) (0.041) (0.025) (0.044) 
EXP 2.147** 2.037 1.156** -1.644 0.793* -0.945* 0.094 -0.635 2.076** 0.441 -0.128 
  (0.856) (1.324) (0.412) (0.988) (0.384) (0.457) (0.310) (0.674) (0.698) (0.328) (1.127) 
POP 15.123* 20.742 -15.178** 9.099 0.220 -1.199 20.740*** 15.131 24.587*** 6.004* 6.667 
  (8.179) (12.171) (6.547) (6.256) (2.910) (3.724) (4.838) (9.958) (7.176) (3.324) (5.244) 
Constant -298.317** -388.930* 249.387** -124.797 -22.695 45.484 -365.118*** -235.641 -458.094*** -101.692* -108.079 
  (125.069) (195.969) (108.384) (91.646) (50.571) (63.999) (83.425) (167.518) (110.154) (55.278) (70.034) 
Observations 259 142 179 182 237 227 215 210 241 241 259 
R-squared within 0.290 0.400 0.215 0.255 0.229 0.293 0.360 0.318 0.293 0.382 0.201 







Table 5b Dependent variable EOFDI – US sample.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS 0.177 -0.010 0.063 0.032 0.192 0.230 -0.074 -0.241 0.048 0.121  
(0.104) (0.354) (0.211) (0.208) (0.193) (0.168) (0.264) (0.210) (0.279) (0.302) 
INF -0.005 0.029 -0.015 0.015 -0.050** 0.047*** 0.004 -0.027* 0.015 0.024  
(0.031) (0.019) (0.039) (0.035) (0.019) (0.013) (0.030) (0.013) (0.022) (0.032) 
GDP 0.101 0.055 0.178*** 0.122*** 0.069 -0.018 0.019 0.151** 0.141* -0.023  
(0.079) (0.076) (0.055) (0.037) (0.045) (0.057) (0.072) (0.061) (0.071) (0.074) 
TRADE -0.001 0.009*** 0.001 0.000 0.014*** -0.002 -0.017** -0.006 0.016** -0.003  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
CORTAX 0.017 -0.052 0.038* 0.029 -0.034 -0.018 -0.004 -0.040 0.102** 0.025  
(0.019) (0.053) (0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027) (0.017) (0.031) (0.041) (0.045) 
INDU 0.025 -0.041 -0.015 -0.079*** -0.003 0.002 0.029 -0.041 0.014 0.078**  
(0.040) (0.026) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.035) (0.033) 
EXRCHAN -2.083** -0.880 -0.927 0.942 -0.775 0.728 1.783* 0.043 -0.157 -1.347  
(0.723) (0.781) (0.968) (0.796) (0.772) (0.733) (0.917) (1.035) (0.888) (0.829) 
EDUC -0.016 0.084** -0.013 0.105** -0.027 -0.040* 0.022 -0.065** 0.079*** 0.007  
(0.018) (0.034) (0.018) (0.039) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) 
PSAVT 0.541** -0.067 -0.244 -0.006 -0.161 -0.468 0.223 -0.108 0.142 1.378**  
(0.213) (0.377) (0.330) (0.260) (0.214) (0.282) (0.243) (0.346) (0.461) (0.584) 
INFRA -0.004 -0.024** -0.014 -0.003 0.001 0.023* 0.001 0.012 0.010 0.030**  
(0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.013) 
EXP 1.300*** 0.871*** 0.550** 0.988** 1.096*** 0.097 0.999*** 0.094 0.219 1.927**  
(0.236) (0.268) (0.253) (0.394) (0.210) (0.322) (0.319) (0.140) (0.551) (0.709) 
POP 2.903*** 8.427** 2.297 0.194 11.358*** 4.237* -5.517*** -0.678 -9.442* 1.263 
 (0.966) (3.676) (2.737) (2.590) (1.057) (2.111) (1.288) (4.505) (5.012) (3.205) 
Constant -56.009*** -150.143** -40.355 -12.499 -202.086*** -72.471* 89.543*** 0.000 156.063* -37.099  
(17.496) (63.423) (46.103) (42.224) (18.935) (35.142) (22.029) (.) (86.004) (51.574) 
Observations 641 512 637 577 613 570 585 394 641 641 
R-squared within 0.350 0.143 0.211 0.120 0.283 0.110 0.136 0.072 0.122 0.277 




Table 6a Dependent variable OFDI flows (high and low IPS regime) – UK sample. 
 
Panel A: High IPS regime 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  AGGREGATE FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPS -4.225** 1.070 -6.174*** 2.555 2.722 -0.917 -3.446* -7.206** 3.009 1.469 -5.554* 
 (1.691) (6.157) (1.320) (6.118) (1.801) (2.010) (1.775) (3.313) (3.798) (2.355) (2.654) 
Observations 124 74 85 81 111 117 112 105 106 107 123 
R-squared within 0.280 0.385 0.451 0.293 0.225 0.409 0.307 0.361 0.398 0.347 0.241 
 
Panel B: Low IPS regime 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPS -0.769 -1.653 1.739*** -0.483 0.709 -0.903 0.076 -1.427 -1.750 0.888 0.644 
 (0.742) (1.539) (0.437) (1.974) (1.212) (1.098) (1.263) (0.920) (1.332) (1.829) (2.124) 
Observations 131 97 101 118 127 126 122 108 127 116 131 
R-squared within 0.362 0.280 0.358 0.357 0.243 0.160 0.339 0.263 0.370 0.305 0.230 





Table 6b Dependent variable OFDI flows (high and low IPS regime) – US sample. 
 
Panel A: High IPS regime  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -1.690 -0.977 1.378 -1.283 1.496 -0.241 0.193 -0.113 1.161 -1.539 
 (1.754) (0.962) (1.257) (1.010) (1.681) (0.867) (0.887) (1.907) (0.806) (1.793) 
Observations 303 224 300 212 288 235 254 142 308 308 
R-squared within 0.138 0.155 0.116 0.184 0.138 0.104 0.160 0.160 0.165 0.143 
 
Panel B: Low IPS regime  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.620 0.425 -0.476 -0.806 0.199 -0.729** 0.311 -1.490 -0.084 -0.611 
 (0.589) (0.587) (0.354) (0.727) (0.457) (0.324) (0.569) (1.172) (0.690) (0.638) 
Observations 327 235 330 271 324 236 274 127 333 333 
R-squared within 0.157 0.126 0.137 0.140 0.165 0.219 0.089 0.198 0.068 0.183 





Table 7a Dependent variable EOFDI (high and low IPS regime) – UK sample. 
 
Panel A: High IPS regime 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPS -0.335 -4.657 -0.932 -0.273 -0.236 -1.084 1.743 -0.217 -1.648 0.077 2.268 
 (1.459) (2.924) (1.736) (1.060) (0.455) (1.284) (1.506) (1.573) (2.536) (0.824) (2.252) 
Observations 128 61 84 72 117 110 109 108 121 120 128 
R-squared within 0.316 0.806 0.455 0.605 0.477 0.364 0.425 0.450 0.363 0.678 0.280 
                        
Panel B: Low IPS regime  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPS -1.347 0.677 -1.248*** 0.360 -0.104 0.751* -0.066 -0.644 0.213 -2.023** 0.126 
 (0.815) (0.905) (0.379) (0.625) (0.775) (0.386) (1.086) (0.763) (0.992) (0.747) (0.779) 
Observations 131 81 95 110 120 117 106 102 120 121 131 
R-squared within 0.477 0.564 0.485 0.332 0.278 0.475 0.549 0.385 0.564 0.485 0.311 





Table 7b Dependent variable EOFDI (high and low IPS regime) – US sample. 
 
Panel A: High IPS regime  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.113 1.483** 0.646** -0.009 0.206 -0.020 0.420 0.244 1.127** -0.132 
 (0.086) (0.622) (0.272) (0.284) (0.400) (0.459) (0.332) (0.262) (0.464) (0.408) 
Observations 308 248 308 277 292 276 288 195 308 308 
R-squared within 0.230 0.261 0.205 0.207 0.272 0.114 0.282 0.166 0.147 0.194 
 
Panel B: Low IPS regime  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS 0.349 -0.498 0.074 0.141 0.297 -0.277 -0.126 -0.472* 0.039 0.216 
 (0.221) (0.302) (0.292) (0.339) (0.260) (0.383) (0.356) (0.255) (0.600) (0.357) 
Observations 333 264 329 300 321 294 297 199 333 333 
R-squared within 0.449 0.151 0.301 0.139 0.355 0.219 0.184 0.094 0.207 0.426 





Table 8a Dependent variable OFDI flows with alternative IPRI index from Property Rights Alliance (PRA) – UK sample. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)  
Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPRI -2.945 -1.132 3.699*** -2.285* -1.145 1.261 3.872** 0.379 -3.461 0.773 1.330 
 (2.645) (2.667) (0.817) (0.984) (1.361) (1.245) (1.301) (2.030) (2.485) (1.287) (1.520) 
Observations 141 79 85 103 130 132 126 116 135 112 141 
R-squared within 0.321 0.233 0.431 0.214 0.201 0.205 0.316 0.257 0.294 0.273 0.194 




Table 8b Dependent variable OFDI flows with alternative IPRI index from Property Rights Alliance (PRA) – US sample.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPRI -0.728 -0.329 -1.621** -0.773 0.029 0.610 1.261 -1.123 -0.113 -0.363 
 (0.725) (0.793) (0.620) (0.559) (0.458) (0.498) (0.679) (1.706) (0.626) (0.487) 
Observations 323 238 321 227 311 245 270 175 323 323 
R-squared within 0.088 0.074 0.107 0.128 0.080 0.075 0.091 0.146 0.054 0.137 






Table 9a Dependent variable EOFDI with alternative IPRI index from Property Rights Alliance (PRA) – UK sample. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
  Aggregate FBT TW PCPRP MM OM TRM TS FS C TM 
IPRI 0.378 -5.213** -1.959** -0.964 0.327 0.117 -0.873 0.337 0.320 2.029** -2.646* 
 (1.512) (1.839) (0.723) (0.947) (0.805) (0.249) (0.956) (0.432) (1.647) (0.819) (1.168) 
Observations 142 66 80 83 126 120 114 124 135 127 142 
R-squared within 0.282 0.468 0.387 0.323 0.229 0.403 0.297 0.314 0.181 0.394 0.224 
Notes: Please see Table 4a. Other independent variables included in the regressions (as in Table 4a) but not reported to conserve space.   
 
 
Table 9b Dependent variable EOFDI with alternative IPRI index from Property Rights Alliance (PRA) – US sample.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPRI 0.224 -0.016 -0.398* -0.388* -0.001 0.745* -0.499* -0.255 0.723 0.228 
 (0.140) (0.198) (0.182) (0.168) (0.106) (0.354) (0.233) (0.149) (0.555) (0.216) 
Observations 323 276 321 278 302 285 289 247 323 323 
R-squared within 0.174 0.138 0.137 0.119 0.065 0.154 0.126 0.123 0.117 0.061 
Notes: Please see Table 4a. Other independent variables included in the regressions (as in Table 4a) but not reported to conserve space.   
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Table 10 Dependent variable OFDI flows (developed and developing countries) – US sample. 
 
Panel A: Developed countries  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.914 -1.055* 1.040 -0.784 0.845 0.058 0.248 -0.955 1.086 0.348 
 (0.916) (0.566) (0.899) (0.528) (0.549) (0.832) (0.781) (1.128) (0.796) (1.171) 
Observations 338 252 337 238 326 274 285 158 342 342 
R-squared within 0.155 0.159 0.085 0.151 0.137 0.088 0.090 0.193 0.106 0.107 
 
Panel B: Developing countries  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.324 0.356 -1.150* -0.642 0.218 -0.206 -0.415 1.215 -0.389 -0.284 
 (0.763) (0.848) (0.558) (0.501) (0.437) (0.251) (0.724) (2.349) (0.665) (0.696) 
Observations 292 207 293 245 286 197 243 111 299 299 
R-squared within 0.180 0.147 0.222 0.143 0.209 0.294 0.109 0.207 0.090 0.223 






Table 11 Dependent variable EOFDI (developed and developing countries) – US sample. 
 
Panel A: Developed countries  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS 0.262** 0.899 0.743*** 0.684** 0.243 0.340 0.529 -0.045 1.402*** 0.185 
 (0.112) (0.619) (0.241) (0.320) (0.243) (0.270) (0.389) (0.337) (0.414) (0.251) 
Observations 342 270 341 306 327 307 313 211 342 342 
R-squared within 0.366 0.210 0.190 0.205 0.237 0.127 0.176 0.180 0.121 0.258 
 
Panel B: Developing countries  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.003 -0.630* -0.049 -0.185 0.157 -0.024 -0.634 -0.358 -0.309 -0.009 
 (0.222) (0.334) (0.415) (0.373) (0.317) (0.156) (0.379) (0.285) (0.521) (0.459) 
Observations 299 242 296 271 286 263 272 183 299 299 
R-squared within 0.450 0.211 0.282 0.155 0.371 0.176 0.222 0.230 0.232 0.471 





Table 12a Dependent variable OFDI – US sample.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS -0.764 -1.379* -0.941* -0.951 1.073 -0.022 -0.154 1.077 -0.092 0.106  
(0.606) (0.718) (0.450) (0.573) (0.845) (0.801) (0.668) (1.524) (0.827) (0.929) 
IPS(t-1) 0.358 0.976 1.576** 0.153 -1.032 -0.045 0.789 -2.329 0.084 -0.514 
 (0.802) (0.977) (0.704) (0.823) (0.899) (0.671) (0.692) (1.413) (0.778) (1.023) 
INF -0.073 0.071 -0.108* 0.086** -0.088 0.029 -0.053 -0.022 -0.059 -0.056  
(0.077) (0.094) (0.056) (0.035) (0.065) (0.033) (0.032) (0.093) (0.038) (0.087) 
GDP 0.193 0.150 0.251 0.099 0.079 0.050 0.052 0.302 -0.004 0.271*  
(0.131) (0.120) (0.155) (0.087) (0.180) (0.081) (0.120) (0.401) (0.129) (0.137) 
TRADE -0.014 0.011 0.021* -0.023** 0.017 0.002 -0.013 -0.012 0.031* -0.024  
(0.027) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.026) (0.017) (0.031) 
CORTAX 0.241** 0.072 0.076 0.142** -0.042 -0.013 -0.074 -0.166 0.082 0.139  
(0.101) (0.087) (0.046) (0.059) (0.069) (0.066) (0.054) (0.120) (0.061) (0.104) 
INDU -0.131** -0.016 -0.095 -0.048 -0.179** -0.045 -0.002 -0.145 -0.002 -0.101  
(0.054) (0.090) (0.060) (0.062) (0.072) (0.046) (0.074) (0.228) (0.081) (0.098) 
EXRC -4.310 -5.350*** -1.374 0.152 -2.883** -2.220** 0.405 6.733** -1.099 0.416  
(3.271) (1.549) (2.226) (2.053) (1.340) (0.916) (1.753) (2.632) (2.570) (2.835) 
EDUC 0.031 0.006 0.191*** 0.099 0.023 -0.001 0.034 0.052 0.177*** 0.183***  
(0.030) (0.069) (0.058) (0.071) (0.052) (0.039) (0.047) (0.142) (0.051) (0.027) 
PSAVT 3.398*** 0.862 0.053 0.182 -0.508 -0.760 0.408 -0.866 0.522 1.247*  
(0.739) (0.776) (0.587) (0.372) (0.725) (0.857) (0.695) (1.293) (0.834) (0.602) 
INFRA 0.060 0.082** 0.041 -0.017 0.098*** 0.012 -0.020 0.115 -0.051* 0.082  
(0.035) (0.032) (0.034) (0.041) (0.028) (0.056) (0.039) (0.067) (0.025) (0.055) 
EXP 0.493 -3.177*** 2.102*** 1.457*** 2.351** 1.199 -0.161 0.384 1.086 2.400***  
(0.604) (0.611) (0.649) (0.386) (0.796) (0.771) (0.659) (1.606) (0.809) (0.803) 
POP 7.558 16.424** 7.448 -3.826 1.855 3.172 -5.436 -20.205** 10.996 9.241 
 (10.899) (6.231) (6.736) (4.971) (3.813) (3.315) (6.150) (8.248) (9.526) (8.629) 
FDISTOCK(t-1) 0.538 2.393* -1.687** -0.223 -0.922 -0.461 -0.818 4.151** -0.699 -0.951 
 (1.046) (1.327) (0.743) (0.583) (1.178) (0.757) (0.646) (1.653) (0.957) (0.888) 
R&D 1.063 1.046 -2.097** 2.016** -0.906* -1.968*** -1.338 0.078 -0.436 -0.176 
 (1.004) (1.347) (0.781) (0.798) (0.504) (0.658) (0.844) (1.358) (0.997) (0.767) 
PATENT -0.013 -0.992 0.370 -0.968** 0.102 0.202 0.667 -2.079** 0.529 -0.026 
 (0.624) (0.685) (0.394) (0.425) (0.378) (0.603) (0.517) (0.741) (0.345) (0.702) 
Constant 0.000 -281.981** -136.862 66.066 -42.615 0.000 103.925 327.554** -201.489 -173.500  
(.) (104.247) (112.545) (82.079) (67.615) (.) (107.188) (134.838) (166.036) (142.853) 
Observations 521 376 520 392 502 387 436 251 526 526 
R-squared within 0.121 0.155 0.120 0.120 0.113 0.094 0.096 0.126 0.071 0.091 
Note: Please see table 4a. 
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Table 12b Dependent variable EOFDI – US sample. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
Aggregate M TM F C PFM MA OM CET OI 
IPS 0.247 -0.692** 0.390 -0.253 0.673** -0.087 -0.126 0.065 0.863* 0.779**  
(0.238) (0.282) (0.410) (0.333) (0.252) (0.478) (0.241) (0.205) (0.484) (0.344) 
IPS(t-1) -0.024 0.713** 0.056 0.356 -0.464 0.736* 0.404 -0.190 -0.756 -0.580** 
 (0.264) (0.306) (0.399) (0.507) (0.387) (0.415) (0.314) (0.200) (0.488) (0.243) 
INF -0.022 0.044** -0.047 0.060** -0.071*** 0.019 -0.019 -0.027 -0.031 0.003  
(0.034) (0.019) (0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (0.012) (0.030) (0.021) (0.035) (0.028) 
GDP 0.215* 0.000 0.236** 0.145*** 0.077 -0.038 0.046 0.204** 0.129 0.083  
(0.114) (0.047) (0.101) (0.043) (0.082) (0.057) (0.102) (0.070) (0.106) (0.066) 
TRADE -0.006 0.013*** -0.003 -0.006*** 0.011** 0.000 -0.019** -0.007 0.020* -0.007*  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) 
CORTAX 0.006 -0.017 0.018 0.027 -0.047* -0.024 -0.056** -0.058 0.110* 0.057  
(0.022) (0.062) (0.030) (0.036) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.033) (0.056) (0.048) 
INDU -0.008 -0.018 -0.040 -0.071** -0.007 -0.020 0.019 -0.062* -0.002 0.055*  
(0.052) (0.022) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.042) (0.029) 
EXRC -2.253** -0.432 -1.496 0.462 -0.495 0.226 0.894 0.596 1.453 -1.205  
(0.774) (1.200) (0.940) (0.757) (1.099) (1.105) (1.176) (1.118) (1.630) (0.949) 
EDUC -0.047** 0.106** -0.023 0.089 -0.023 0.003 0.067** -0.074** 0.106** 0.004  
(0.017) (0.037) (0.022) (0.052) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.029) (0.041) (0.027) 
PSAVT 0.860*** 0.536 0.201 0.036 0.126 0.097 0.118 -0.337 0.623 1.534*  
(0.264) (0.441) (0.351) (0.336) (0.280) (0.365) (0.370) (0.532) (0.769) (0.716) 
INFRA 0.025** -0.050* 0.003 0.013 0.008 0.024 0.029 0.023 0.004 0.036**  
(0.010) (0.024) (0.014) (0.026) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.036) (0.015) 
EXP 1.241*** -0.454 0.500 0.554 1.694*** 0.276 0.504* 0.101 0.014 1.604***  
(0.328) (0.472) (0.374) (0.453) (0.280) (0.470) (0.269) (0.312) (0.742) (0.468) 
POP 5.162*** 9.474** 4.194 0.001 14.348*** 4.281 -4.125* -0.607 -7.824 2.435 
 (1.380) (3.554) (3.763) (3.907) (1.146) (2.756) (2.181) (5.617) (6.080) (3.766) 
FDISTOCK(t-1) -0.164 1.188*** -0.400 0.540 -1.044*** -0.800 -0.109 -0.205 -0.551 -0.082 
 (0.280) (0.330) (0.250) (0.337) (0.112) (0.475) (0.267) (0.406) (0.626) (0.366) 
R&D 0.580** 0.737 -0.806 0.517 0.384 -1.890*** 0.470 -0.126 -1.925** -0.087 
 (0.270) (0.551) (0.490) (0.353) (0.387) (0.424) (0.569) (0.586) (0.801) (0.325) 
PATENT -0.435** 0.790* -0.444*** -0.533 0.245 0.398 -0.455*** -0.172 0.096 0.036 
 (0.156) (0.383) (0.146) (0.319) (0.193) (0.350) (0.139) (0.311) (0.368) (0.211) 
Constant -89.988*** 0.000 0.000 -8.469 0.000 -70.212 73.541* 21.992 138.999 -54.123  
(25.095) (.) (.) (64.296) (.) (45.734) (36.331) (98.832) (104.577) (62.068) 
N 526 419 524 475 504 462 477 348 526 526 
R-squared within 0.413 0.200 0.271 0.131 0.331 0.161 0.142 0.095 0.132 0.288 
Note: Please see table 4a. 
 
